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Before discussing the merits of this case, the defendant
in error, hereinafter called the city, moves to dismiss the
writ of error herein as being improvidently awarded, for
the reason that the petition for a writ of error did not
make the record in the court below a part of said petition.
[2]
Time and time again your Honors have held that a peti
tion for a writ of error is a pleading. Among the cases
so holding are Patterson V. Commonwealth, 139 Va. 589,
597 and Bollard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 1005.
In the case of Eaton v. Moore, 111 Va. 400, 403, this was
said:
"It is an elementary rule of pleading that the
declaration must allege material facts sufficient to
show a complete right of action in the plaintiff. The
facts must, moreover, be distinctly and not inferen-
tially alleged, and must be set forth with definite-
ness and certainty. The courts cannot supply by in-
tendment material averments which the pleader has
failed to make."
So far as concerns the petition for a writ of error in this
case, the transcript of the record physically attached to the
petition is no more a part of it than would be the Declara
tion of Independence or the Virginia Bill of Rights. In
order to consider it, your Honors must infer that it is a
transcript of the record of the judgment complained of.
For this reason, the city feels confident that the writ of
error was improvidently awarded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By an ordinance approved August 16, 1924 (Record p.
53), the Westhampton Improvement Corporation, composed
of residents of the County of Henrico residing west of the
corporate limits of the city was given the right to connect
its sewerage system, when constructed, with a sewer of
[3]
the city at a point where the corporation line of the city
crosses Franklin Street, upon the condition that all of the
costs and expenses thereof should be borne by the West-
hampton Improvement Corporation or its assignees and
upon the further condition that the Westhampton Improve
ment Corporation, or its assignees, should pay to the city
a sum equal to five dollars for each and every individual
connection that should be made to the sewer of the West
hampton Improvement Corporation. By section 2 of the
ordinance the city reserved the right at any time to amend
or repeal the same.
By a general ordinance approved May 14, 1926 (Record
p. 56), it was provided that all non-residents, in addition
to the five dollar connection fee, should pay an annual
charge of five dollars for the use of the city's sewer, to be
assessed and charged as of February 1st of each year and
to be charged and collected in the same manner as other
rentals for the use of city sewers. This ordinance of course,
had the effect of amending the ordinance of August 16,
1924, and imposed upon the Westhampton Improvement
Corporation or its assignees, the same annual charge for
use of the city's sewer as was imposed upon all other non
residents. By a further ordinance approved June 17, 1929,
the ordinance of May 14, 1926, was amended so as to pro
vide that the five dollar annual use charge should be paid
as personal city taxes are paid, including interest and
penalty if the same should not be paid by any such non
resident prior to the first day of February following the
year in which the use charge was made. By an act of
Assembly, approved April 11, 1927 (Acts 1927, p. 20), the
territory covered by the Westhampton Improvement Corpo
ration was made a sanitary district, under the title of "Hen-
[4]
rico Sanitary District No. 1", which district was given
large powers with respect to providing the inhabitants of
said district with water, sewerage, power and gas sys
tems and was authorized to contract with any person, firm,
corporation or municipality with regard to the connection
of any such system or systems with any other system or
systems then in operation or thereafter to be established.
By deed dated June 23, 1927 (Record p. 62), the West-
hampton Improvement CJorporation conveyed to the Board
"all the privileges granted to it by an ordinance of the
City of Richmond approved August 16, 1924, an ordinance
approved May 15, 1925, and an ordinance approved May
14, 1926", the last named of which imposed the annual
charge of five dollars for each connection.
It appears from the record (page 72), that in place of
the five dollar annual charge for each individual user im
posed by the city upon the Westhampton Improvement
CJorporation and its assignees, the Board of Supervisors
collected from each individual user an annual charge of
fifteen dollars and that in place of the city's five dollar
connection charge, the supervisors imposed a charge of
forty dollars.
The record also shows (page 82), that the city sewer to
which connection was made by the Sanitary District, dis
charges into Bacon Quarter branch, which in turn flows
into Shockoe creek and thence into James river, as is shown
by the following question propounded by counsel for peti
tioner to Allen J. Saville, the engineer who designed the
sewerage system of the Westhampton Improvement Cor
poration and supervised its construction:
Q. It appears that the sewer connects with the
[5]
City (Line at the point indicated, where the pres
ent corporate line crosses Franklin Street, and
thence discharges into Bacon Quarter Branch,
Shockoe Creek and James River. Will you please
tell what connection you had with the making of
that connection, and why it was made?
The record further shows that noTie of the natural drain
age of the Sanitary District is into Bacon Quarter branch
but, on the contrary, that a small portion of the district
drains directly into James river, while the major portion
is in the watershed of the Chickahominy river. The sig
nificance of this is most important, as will be shown in
the argument. Thus:
In the statement of facts contained in the petition for a
writ of error, the following appears at page 16:
"The work of designing and constructing was
committed to a former city engineer of the city of
Richmond. He had the choice of two routes, one
northwestwardly through Jones Run (Johns creek)
into the Chickahominy and the other across a slight
divide into the adjacent drainage area to a connec
tion with the natural waterways in the annexed
territory, Bacon Quarter Branch and Shockoe
Creek * * (Italics supplied.)
Again, commencing near the bottom of page 69, James
Bolton, chief of the bureau of surveys and designs in the
city department of public works, was asked in what water
shed are located the properties served by the Westhamp-
ton Improvement Corporation's sewer system, to which he
replied:
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"It is in two watersheds. The major portion of
it is in the Chickahominy River watershed. There
is a small portion of it in the James River water
shed. » * » There is an area which might be
called the CJountry Club area between the Three
Chopt Road and the University which drains nat
urally towards James River, but the main portion
between the Gary Street Road, the Three CJhopt
Road, Patterson Avenue and Woodlawn Avenue nat
urally drains towards the Chickahominy through its
tributaries Jones' Branch (Johns Creek), Jordan's
Branch, and a portion of it would naturally go into
Horsepond Branch. Those tributaries all go into or
empty into what is known as Young's Pond in Bryan
Park and thence to the Chickahominy River."
The next question propounded to Mr. Bolton and his an
swer thereto follow:
"Q. Does any portion of that territory drain nat
urally into Bacon Quarter Branch?
"A. None of that portion would naturally drain
towards Bacon Quarter Branch."
And finally on this point we have the testimony (page
82) of R. Stuart Royster, supervising engineer for the
Sanitary District and a witness for the defendant in the
trial court:
"Q. Is it a fact that none of the territory of




After the learned trial judge had entered judgment for
the plaintiff, the defendant moved the court (page 90) to
set aside said judgment and to enter judgment for the de
fendant upon the grounds: 1. Because the judgment of the
court is contrary to the law and the evidence; 2. Because it
is excessive; 3. Because it is without evidence to sustain it.
The second and third of these grounds may be disposed of
by reference to the notice of motion for judgment and to
the testimony of J. M. Miller, deputy city comptroller, whose
evidence is without contradiction and was given without
exception thereto.
The principal sum sued for was six thousand, five hun
dred and five and 60/100 dollars, which was the amount of
the judgment. The notice of motion (commencing at the
bottom of page 42), states how this sum is arrived at: In
the year 1929 there were sixteen connections in the Sani
tary District made in 1928 or prior thereto and five hun
dred and thirty-three new connections were made in that
year, 1929, for which there was due the city a connection
charge of five dollars, each, or twenty-seven hundred and
forty-five dollars, to which was added a penalty of seven
per centum under the provisions of section 171 of chapter
10 of the Richmond City Code of 1924 (page 60), bringing
the amount due for the year 1929 to twenty-nine hundred
and thirty-seven & 15/100 dollars. By an ordinance ap
proved June 17, 1929, (page 57), effective in the year 1930
and thereafter, an annual use charge of five dollars was
made for each non-resident connection in addition to the
connection charge of five dollars. For the year 1930, the
five hundred and forty-nine users who had been connected
up in 1929 and prior thereto were charged for at the use
rate of five dollars each, making twenty-seven hundred and
[8]
forty-five dollars and one hundred and eighteen new con
nections were made at five dollars each, amounting to five
hundred and ninety dollars, or a total for the year 1930 of
three thousand, three hundred and thirty-five dollars, which
the seven per centum penalty brought to thirty-five hun
dred and sixty-eight & 45/100 dollars. This last mentioned
sum and the twenty-nine hundred and thirty-seven & 15/100
dollars due for 1929 aggregate the sum of sixty-five hun
dred and five & 60/100 dollars, the amount of the judg
ment.
Reverting now to the testimony of the deputycomptrol-
ler of the city (page 71), we find that, after stating he had
supplied the figures to the city's attorney as set out in the
notice of motion, he was asked and answered:
"Q. Where did you get them?
"A. I got the figures from a list furnished by the
Clerk of the district, as checked by the Department
of Public Works."
As before stated, this evidence was neither contradicted
nor objected to, and hence, no matter how erroneous the
judgment may be from a legal standpoint, there is not the
slightest ground for pretending that it is either excessive
or without evidence to support it.
ARGUMENT
The judgment complained of is characterized on page 1
of the petition as "very remarkable." When it is recalled
that the city is seeking to recover from the supervisors the
modest sum of five dollars for each connection made and a
[9]
like sum of five dollars annually as a use charge, and that
the supervisors, availing themselves of the city's facilities,
exact of the citizens of the county the exhorbitant sum of
forty dollars for each connection and an additional annual
use charge of fifteen dollars, it is submitted that this slur
upon the city's attitude in seeking to recover its just dues
is altogether unwarranted and should receive scant consid
eration in a court of conscience. The judgment is also char
acterized as "unprecedented." This is probably correct, for
the reason that doubtless no political entity ever heretofore
undertook to evade its obligations upon any such flimsy and
super-technical grounds as disclosed by this record.
It is stated in the petition (page 28) that there are two
fundamental questions to be determined, one the right of
the city of Richmond by ex parte ordinances of its council
to determine the rights and liabilities of the board of super
visors of the county of Henrico in the premises stated
(whatever that may mean), and the other the meaning and
effect to be given the annexation decree relied upon in the
special plea (page 46). These two questions are taken up
in the petition in their inverse order, and that course will
be followed in this brief.
In the year 1913, the city of Richmond undertook to an
nex extensive portions of the counties of Henrico and Ches
terfield and the proceedings resulted in the entry of a de
cree on June 27, 1914, which granted to the city a part of
the territory asked for and, in pursuance of the annexation
statute, prescribed the terms and conditions upon which
annexation should be had. In order to set at rest any ques
tion as to the right of abutters upon natural water courses
to continue to drain into these streams after annexation.
[10]
the Circuit Court of the County of Henrico provided in the
fourteenth clause of its aforesaid decree as follows:
"It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that
the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield shall have
the right to turn any water or sewerage into the
natural water-ways which are included in the an
nexed territory."
The sweeping claim is made by counsel for the petitioner
that the language of this fourteenth clause is broad enough
to permit the supervisors of the county of Henrico, by arti
ficial means, to turn aU the water and sewerage of the
county into any natural water-way that might happen to
be within the confines of the annexed territory. Carried to
its logical conclusion, this would extend to the county au
thorities the right to dump upon the city of Richmond all
the water and sewerage of the county between James River
on the south, Tuckahoe creek (the boundary between Hen
rico and Goochland counties) on the west and the Chicka-
hominy river on the north. Such an interpretation is pal
pably absurd, and would impose an unfair and intolerable
burden upon the city. Of course the court intended by its
language merely to preserve pre-existing rights, but not
to impose any such additional servitude upon the city as
that contended for by counsel.
Even so, assuming but not conceding that the language
of the annexation decree is susceptible of any such mon
strous construction, it is manifest that the court did not
undertake to require the city to provide artificial ducts to
convey all this sewerage into Bacon Quarter branch or any
other natural water-way, nor to authorize the county of
Henrico in its sovereign capacity to invade the sovereignty
[11]
of the city of Richmond and to compel the latter to supply
artificial seweragefacilities to take care of all the sewerage
which the former might elect to divert from its natural
course.
We now invite attention to the statement of petitioners
counsel (page 29): "Among other things the city built
along the western outer line of the annexed territory a
sewer main 27 inches in diameter, crossing Franklin Street
at that line, connecting with and dischwrging into Bacon's
Quarter Branch and Shockoe Creek." (Italics supplied). It
is claimed that this 27-inch sewer (which provided the out
fall for the system of the Westhampton Improvement Cor
poration pursuant to the ordinance of August 16, 1924),
was constructed in consequence of the annexation decree
and that therefore the county was entitled to drain all the
water and sewerage in the western portion of the county
into this 27-inch sewer—an absolute non^equitur.
The language of the fifteenth clause of the annexation
decree is as follows:
"It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that
water, sewer and gas mains shall be extended into
and through the annexed territory so soon as popu
lation and conditions demand the same."
This provision was clearly intended for the protection of
the residents in the newly acquired territory and not for
the benefit of that portion of the county which retained its
political integrity. It was left to the honest judgment and
discretion of the city council to extend these facilities into
and through the annexed territory "so soon as population
and conditions demand the same." But according to the
argument of counsel, the county of Henrico had the right
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to demand that the city eo instanti, should install these fa
cilities for the benefit of the county without charge there
for, not only sewer facilities, but free gas and free water
as well. If we may borrow the language of petitioner's
counsel used in another connection, the bare statement of
such a claim "carries its death wound on its face." Obvi
ously, if the county did not have the right to demand the
immediate construction of this sewer for its uses, it did not
have any such right after its acquisition of the system of
the Westhampton Improvement Corporation, except as the
assignee of that company, and then only in accordance with
the provisions and conditions of the contract between that
company and the city of Richmond.
The other ground on which the county seeks to evade
liability is that the ordinance of August 16, 1924, granting
to the Westhampton Improvement (Corporation the right to
connect with the city sewer at a point where Franklin
Street crosses the corporation line is invalid, as well as
the subsequent ordinances amendatory thereof.
This Westhampton Improvement Corporation was organ
ized for the purpose of furnishing sewerage to those citizens
of Henrico county who resided within the territory which
afterwards became Henrico County Sanitary District No. 1.
The sewerage system was worthless unless an outfall could
be procured. Accordingly the company negotiated with
the city of Richmond with the result that the ordinance of
August 16, 1924, was passed, which imposed upon the com
pany the obligation to pay to the city a sum equal to five
dollars for each individual connection made to the com
pany's system. The city reserved the right at any time to
amend or repeal that ordinance. On May 14, 1926, a gen
eral ordinance (applying to the Westhampton Improvement
[13]
Corporation as well as to all other non-resident users) was
passed imposing upon such non-residents an annual v;se
charge of five dollars in addition to the connection charge
theretofore imposed. By act of Assembly approved April
11,1927, the territory comprising that portion of the county
within which the Improvement Corporation was authorized
to act was established as Henrico County Sanitary District
No. 1, and on June 23, 1927, the supervisors obtained from
the Improvement Corporation a deed conveying the latter's
entire sewer system and rights of way. The third clause
of that deed reads:
"The Westhampton Improvement Corporation as
signs to the party of the second part all the privi
leges granted to it by an ordinance of the City of
Richmond approved August 16, 1924, an ordinance
approved May 15, 1925, and an ordinance approved
May 14, 1926."
So that, when the city made demand upon the county in
1928 for compensation under the just mentioned ordinances,
the supervisors' position was this: We have acquired a
sewerage system which is useless without an outfall; our
predecessor in title has made provision with the city of
Richmond for such outfall and has agreed to pay compen
sation therefor; but the ordinances granting this outfall
are invalid; therefore we will continue to use the outfall
and will withhold the compensation agreed upon. Such a
proposition, we submit, is as novel in law as hitherto un
heard of in ethics.
In the case of Brant v. Va. Coal <& Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326,
in discussing the principle of equitable estoppel in that case,
the Supreme Court said at page 336:
[14]
"There are undoubtedly cases where a party may
be concluded from asserting his original rights to
property in consequence of his acts or conduct, in
which the presence of fraud, actual or constructive,
is wanting; as, where one of two innocent parties
must suffer from the negligence of another, he
throughwhose agency the negligence wasoccasioned
will be held to bear the loss, and where one has re
ceived:the fruits of a transaction, he is not permitted
to deny its validity whilst retaining its benefits. But
such cases are generally referable to other princi
ples than that of equitable estoppel, although the
same result is produced; thus the first case here
mentioned is the affixing of liability upon the party
who from negligence indirectly occasioned the in
jury, and the second is the application of the doc
trine of ratification or election."
In Johnson v. Powhatan Min, Co., 127 Va. 352, your
Honors quoted the foregoing language with approval and
added; (page 362):
"There is close analogy also to the doctrine that
one cannot 'approbate and reprobate', discussed in
3 Eng. Rul. Cas. 310. This rule is stated thus: 'A
person who succeeds in one action in having an in
strument pronounced invalid against him, cannot
in another action set up a claim under the same in
strument treated as valid. Nor can a person who
has succeeded in persuading the court to adopt for
his advantage a certain construction of an instru
ment, turn round and repudiate that construction
when the benefit under it is claimed against him.'
[15]
Applying the doctrine, Lord Eldon, in Ker V. Wav^-
ckope, 1 Bligh 21, said; 'It is equally settled in the
law of Scotland, as of England, that no person can
accept and reject the same instrument.' In Smith
V. Baker, L. R., 8 C. P. 350, 42 L. J. C. P. 155, it is
said: 'A man cannot say at one time that the trans
action is valid and thereby obtain some advantage to
which he could only be entitled on the footing that it
is valid, and at another time say it is void for the
purpose of securing some further advantage."
Your Honors further quoted with approval in the case of
Johnson v. Powhatan Min. Co., supra, the American note to
the case of Ker v. Wauohope, to this effect:
"A person cannot claim under an instrument with
out confirming it. He must found his claim on the
whole, and cannot adopt that feature or operation
which makes in his favor, and at the same time re
pudiate or contradict another which is counter or
adverse to it. He 'cannot accept and reject the
same instrument'."
In School Board v. Payne, 151 Va. 240, 249, your Honors
also quoted with approval the following from the case of
Fox V. Winds, 127 Mo. 502:
"The principle is recognized and established in
this country almost precisely the same as in En
gland, and rests upon the equitable ground that no
man can be permitted to claim inconsistent rights
with regard to the same subject, and that any one
who claims an interest under an agreement, is
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bound to give full effect to that instrument so far
as he can. A person cannot accept and reject the
same instrument, or having availed himself of it as
to part, defeat its provisions in any other part, and
this applies to deeds, wills and all other instru
ments whatsoever."
Other authorities to the same effect might be cited, but
it is deemed that the foregoing are sufficient.
Two reasons are assigned why the ordinances aforesaid
are invalid: First, "that they cannot be given extra terri
torial force and operation"; Second, "that all municipal
ordinances must be within the express charter powers and
they must also be reasonable."
We think we have demonstrated that the county is pre
cluded from setting up either of such defences but, never
theless, will proceed to examine them in the order stated.
In the first place, counsel have entirely misconceived the
effect of these ordinances. It is not necessary to give them
any extra territorial operation and they have none. The
contract as embodied in them permitted the Improvement
Corporation or its assignees to collect sewerage within a
definitely prescribed territory andto deliver it to the cityof
Richmond at a designated point on its corporation line,
thence to be carried through the city eventually into James
river. In consideration of this service the city was to re
ceive compensation measured by the number of individual
users of the company's system, whichwas stated in the ordi
nance of August 16, 1924, (page 54) to be "a sum equal
to Five Dollars ($5.00) for each and every individual con
nection that is made to the said sewer of the Westhampton
Improvement Corporation." In addition to this connec-
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tion charge, the city, by the ordinance of May 14, 1926,
(page 56) imposed ujwn non-resident users "an annual
charge of Five Dollars ($5.00) for the use of such sewer
to be assessed and charged as of February 1st of each year
and to be charged and collected as other rentals for the use
of city sewers".
It is apparent, therefore, that the city never undertook
to render any extra territorial service and never gave or
intended to give its ordinances any extra territorial force
or operation.
In the second place, the broad statement that "all muni
cipal ordinances must be within the express charter pow
ers," may not stand unchallenged. It is refuted by counsel's
own quotation (page 35) from Dillon, who groups the
powers of a municipality into three classes:
First: Those granted in express words.
Second: Those necessarily or fairly implied in or inci
dent to the powers expressly granted.
Third: Those essential to the declared objects and pur
poses of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indis
pensable.
The argument is made that, because the city is expressly
authorized in section 19e of its charter to "furnish water,
gas and electricity to consumers for domestic or commercial
purposes and charge and collect compensation therefor,
whether within or without the corporate limits", and be
cause no such express authority as to sewers is conferred,
the city is precluded from making to non-residents any
charge for the use of its sewers.
To which we reply, first, that no such express authority
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is necessary in respect of sanitary sewers. Mr. Bolton tes
tified without contradiction at page 71 that only the sani
tary system of the county is connected with the city sys
tem; and that the county's storm sewerage is carried out
through John's creek and on to the Chickahominy and is
not connected with the city's system.
The supplying of gas, water and electricity are distinctly
corporate functions, while the supplying of sanitary sew
erage is essentially a governmental function. Section 19 of
the city charter empowers the city council to enact suitable
ordinances to secure and promote the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the city, by them deemed proper "for the
safety, health, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
morals of the community." Clearly the making of provi
sion for the disposition of the sanitary sewerage of a thickly
populated settlement on the outskirts of a city is conducive
to securing and promoting the health of the inhabitants
within the corporate limits. It is not simply convenient,
but indispensable. It may be remarked in passing that,
when the city constructed its 27-inch sewer to the corporate
line at Franklin Street, with commendable forethought, it
designed the same with a view of taking care in the future,
through annexation or otherwise, of the very drainage from
the county that is now delivered to its sewer. This of course
entailed a considerably larger initial outlay, which the
county authorities have completely ignored in making their
demands for free service.
In the second place, as we have previously pointed out, in
providing an outfall for the county's sewerage, the city does
not furnish anything beyond its corporate limits as it does
in the case of supplying gas, water or electric current to
non-resident users, and we submit that the right to receive
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and dispose of the sanitary sewerage of a neighboring com
munity is fairly implied in or incident to the power ex
pressly granted in section 191 of the city charter to "con
struct sewers, culverts or drains under the streets, alleys
or other public places in the city."
Finally, it is contended by counsel that the city ordi
nances are unreasonable. We ask by what standard are
they unreasonable? Surely, not by the standard of the
county's regulation or ordinance which exacts of the county
citizen eight times as much for a connection as the city iiS
attempting to collect and three times as much for the an
nual use. The city charges its own citizens for the use of
its sewers at the rate of ten cents per lineal foot per annum,
which, in the case of a lot having a frontage of fifty feet,
would amount to an annual charge of five dollars. Were
the city to apply the same rate to the county users, it is
doubtful if a single lot owner would pay less than five
dollars and is certMn that the greater number would pay
much more than that.
Of course, if the ordinances under discussion are valid
and binding upon the county, the city is entitled to the
interest claimed in the notice of motion and the penalties
for non-payment provided in section 3 of chapter 12 of
the City Code (page 60).
But even if we concede, which we do not, that the ordi
nances relating to the Westhampton Improvement Corpo
ration are ultra vires, there is still another and a complete
reply to the contention of the county. If the city had no
right to contract with the Improvement Corporation, it
clearly had a right to contract with the supervisors of
Henrico County under the act of April 11, 1927, creating
Henrico County Sanitary District No. 1.
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By sub-section (a) of Section 1 of said act, the super
visors were authorized to construct and operate a sewerage
system for the use and benefit of the public in said district.
By sub-section (b) of Section 1 of said act, they were au
thorized to acquire by gift, purchase, condemnation, lease
or otherwise, any such sewerage system in any such district
and by sub-section (g) of Section 1 of that act, the super
visors were specifically authorized to "negotiate and con
tract with any person, firm, corporation or municipality
with regard to the connection of any such system or systems
now in operation or hereafter to be established, and with
regard to any other matter necessary and proper for the
construction or operation and maintenance of any such sys
tem within the said sanitary district." This of course nec
essarily implied the authority of any municipality (includ
ing the City of Richmond) to contract with the supervisors
for the connection of their system with its system.
It may be argued, however, that the notice of motion in
the case at bar did not contain an indehitatus asmmpsit
count. That is not necessary.
In Rinehart v. Pirkey, 126 Va. 346, your Honors quoted
with approval at page 353 from the valuable work Burk's
Pleading and Practice, concerning notices of motion to the
following effect:
"They are viewed with great indulgence by the
courts; and if the terms of the notice be general, the
court will construe it favorably, and apply it ac
cording to the truth of the case, so far as the notice
will admit of such application. If it be such that
the defendant cannot mistake the object of the mo
tion, it will be sufficient."
[21]
to which your Honors added:
"This of course means that the notice is good on
demurrer if the defendant cannot reasonably mis
take its object. And, as said in the opinion of the
court delivered by Judge Buchanan in Union Central
Life Ins. Co. V. PoUard, 94 Va. 146, at pp. 153-4, 'If
the notice be such that the defendant cannot mis
take its object, it will be sufficient. » ♦ ♦ if
the defendant desires more specific information of
the plaintiff's claim than is contained in the notice,
he has the right to move the court to order the plain
tiff to file a statement of the particulars of his claim.
If the court makes such order and the plaintiff fails
to comply with it, the court may exclude evidence of
any matter not so plainly described in the notice as
to give the defendant information of its character.
€ode, sec. 3249'."
In the case of Barhach & Co. V. Charleston Port Termi
nals, 143 Va. 656, the language of the notice of motion was
as follows:
"For services rendered in stevedoring, handling
and storing a certain lot of scrap iron at your special
instance and request."
It was claimed that under this notice the Charleston Com
pany could not recover on a quantum meruit or for money
expended at request of defendant, but only upon proof
that it had itself performed the work. Your Honors had
this to say beginning at page 682:
"Under the repeated decisions that notices of mo-
[22]
tion for judgment are to be liberally construed, we
are of opinion that the language of the notice is suf
ficient to admit of its being considered as a com
mon count in assumpsit for money laid out and ex
pended at the instance of another, and therefore,
the Charleston Company was not bound for recov
ery to rely entirely upon proof of a contract with
the Barbach Company that it, the Charleston Com
pany would itself perform the work of stevedoring."
We therefore feel satisfied in urging upon your Honors
that the notice of motion in this case is sufficient to set up
an implied promise on the part of the supervisors to pay a
reasonable compensation for the use of the city's facilities,
pursuant to the aforesaid act of April 11, 1927. The fact
that the compensation claimed under the ordinances afore
said is reasonable has already been demonstrated.
We submit with confidence that the judgment of the trial
court is plainly right and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES E. CANNON,
Attorney for 'City of Richmond.
